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Summary
As COVID-19 spreads across the globe, crowdsourced
digital technology harbours the potential to improve sur-
veillance and epidemic control, primarily through in-
creased information coverage, higher information speed,
fast case tracking and improved proximity tracing. Target-
ing those aims, COVID-19-related smartphone and web-
based health applications are continuously emerging,
leading to a multitude of options, raising ethical and legal
challenges and potentially overwhelming end users.
Building on an existing trustworthiness checklist for digital
health applications, we searched the literature and devel-
oped a framework to guide the assessment of smartphone
and web-based applications that aim to contribute to con-
trolling the current epidemic or mitigating its effects. It fur-
ther integrates epidemiological subject knowledge and a
legal analysis, outlining the mechanisms through which
new applications can support the fight against COVID-19.
The resulting framework includes 40 questions across 8
domains on “purpose”, “usability”, “information accuracy”,
“organisational attributes / reputation”, “transparency”,
“privacy” and “user control / self-determination”. All ques-
tions should be primarily answerable from publicly avail-
able data, as provided by application manufacturers. The
framework aims to guide end users in choosing a trans-
parent, safe and valuable application and suggests a set
of information items that developers ideally make available
to allow a balanced judgement and facilitate the trustwor-
thiness of their products.
Keywords: digital health, mHealth, COVID-19, evalua-
tion, checklist, epidemiology, law
Introduction
The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic is barely 6
months old but has swept across countries and continents
with an almost unprecedented speed (e.g., as tracked in
[1]). The fast transmission of SARS-CoV-2 also exposed
weaknesses in current monitoring practices in Switzerland,
which heavily rely on decentralised reporting of positive
laboratory tests, flowing from diagnosing clinicians to can-
tonal and federal health authorities, as well as on the count
of general practitioner consultations due to flu-like illness-
es (“Sentinella System”) [2].
The ability to take timely action, however, depends on
early warning systems that provide nearly real-time, ac-
tionable information on emerging diseases. Crowdsourced
digital tools, relying on citizens to collect data, offer
promising possibilities for faster, population-based moni-
toring of symptoms and movement patterns [3, 4]. In fact,
several crowdsourced smartphone and web-based health
applications (henceforth referred to as apps) have emerged
since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and the begin-
ning of the lockdown. Many of these have different pur-
poses (e.g., monitoring of the epidemic, tracing, or track-
ing of own movements) and quite distinct technical
approaches (e.g., the amount of collected personal data,
centralised vs decentralised storage of data) [5]. The com-
mon element of many of these apps is that citizens actively
or passively (by the use of smartphone sensors) collect and
store certain data that, when aggregated, can be informa-
tive about the current state of the COVID-19 epidemic.
One example in Switzerland is covidtracker.ch, which col-
lects and maps flu-like symptom reports. Other apps may
also passively collect sensor data, such as geolocation or
Bluetooth-enabled tracking and proximity tracing.
The multitude of technologies and approaches of emerging
apps in the context of COVID-19 also harbour risks for
end users and potential for confusion. From a privacy per-
spective, the collection of data through digital devices is
extremely sensitive, for which robust privacy safeguards
are of paramount importance [6]. For example, the col-
lection of geolocation data poses special challenges for
privacy, depending on the accuracy of geolocation posi-
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thermore, as data are often collected under the premise
of very broad goals, (e.g., their anonymised use by health
authorities to predict the future course of the epidemic),
non-specialists can rarely judge whether these are achiev-
able and truly contributing towards a better epidemic con-
trol. Along the same lines, app descriptions rarely provide
enough information to allow end users to assess the risk
for privacy rights infringement or data ownership loss. Ul-
timately, these uncertainties cause confusion, which in turn
may lead to low acceptance and use. Low participation is
a real risk for potentially reliable and privacy-preserving
software, undermining the well-intended goals of many
crowdsourced apps for better epidemic monitoring and
tracking.
This study aimed to develop a framework to provide guid-
ance on the alignment of a specific app with epidemiolog-
ical principles to contain the epidemic spread, as well as
on compliance with the current legal basis in Switzerland
concerning privacy and constitutional rights. Based on an
existing framework [9], we synthesised domains that facil-
itate the assessment of an app’s trustworthiness, enriched
by technical, epidemiological and legal aspects. The incor-
poration of these aspects supports crowdsourced apps to
effectively achieve their purpose (such as to help managing
the epidemic or its consequences on personal well-being)
while also adhering to the individual rights.
Characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic
and current monitoring/surveillance weakness-
es
In order to understand the role of apps in controlling the
COVID-19 pandemic, it is key to consider viral and epi-
demiological characteristics, as well as current weaknesses
in disease monitoring/surveillance.
The current COVID-19 pandemic shares some similarities
with seasonal influenza. First, the ongoing epidemic phase
of COVID-19 in Switzerland coincides with the regular in-
fluenza season, and symptoms overlap [10, 11]. Both in-
fections can trigger symptoms such as fever, dry cough,
general malaise, headaches, sneezing or muscle aches. A
second commonality is that both the influenza virus and
SARS-CoV-2 can be effectively transmitted while a person
is still pre-symptomatic. Nevertheless, some differences in
symptomologies have started to emerge. For example, loss
of smell or taste was relatively frequently reported in per-
sons with COVID-19 and is now considered a distinguish-
ing symptom [12].
However, the COVID-19 pandemic is in many ways more
dangerous than seasonal influenza. Not only does SARS-
CoV-2 spread faster than a seasonal influenza [13], it also
seems to be associated with a higher case fatality ratio and
a considerably higher proportion of cases needing inten-
sive care and ventilation [11]. Current data indicate that
80% of infections have a “mild” disease course, with the
definition of “mild” disease course ranging from almost no
symptoms to more severe symptoms and pneumonia, but
not requiring ventilation [10]. Of these, around 20% are es-
timated to remain asymptomatic. In persons who eventual-
ly develop symptoms, the median duration from infection
to first symptom occurrence lies between 4 and 5 days, but
can extend up to 14 days [14, 15]. Nevertheless, infectivi-
ty is believed to start 1–3 days before symptom onset [16],
and transmission from pre-symptomatic persons is easily
possible, as demonstrated by a case series from Bavaria
[17]. Indeed, some studies estimate the proportion of pre-
symptomatic transmissions to be in the order of 40% [18,
19]. This is not surprising given that viral shedding pri-
marily occurs in the upper respiratory tract with high vi-
ral loads that tend to peak at the onset of symptoms [16,
20]. These characteristics render transmission by droplets
or fomites quite simple and are possible explanations for
the high basic reproductive number (R0) of between 2 and
3 in uncontained epidemics (that is, a single infected per-
son infects on average two to three other persons), thus re-
sulting in an exponential increase of case numbers [21, 22].
From a public health and health authority viewpoint, the
above-mentioned characteristics of the epidemic exposed
some challenges in current surveillance practices. The
main data source for surveillance is positive polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) tests to measure Sars-CoV-2 viral
loads, the results of which are reported to cantonal and
federal authorities. However, the rapid dynamics of trans-
mission, with an infectivity window of 1–3 days prior to
symptom onset [16], as well as the estimated proportion of
10–20% of asymptomatic persons [23], suggest that dai-
ly reported case numbers capture only a fraction of the re-
al number of new cases (incidence). Furthermore, because
testing capacities were and remain limited, most countries
have imposed more or less restrictive conditions as test-
ing criteria for SARS-CoV-2, for instance by only testing
persons with symptoms or specific risk exposures (e.g.,
contact with a confirmed SARS-CoV-2 positive person).
Additionally, current reporting occurs around 1–2 days af-
ter sample collection and testing. Because of the epidem-
ic’s transmission dynamics, this reporting delay is signifi-
cant and may impede epidemic control and efforts to break
transmission chains [24]. The same applies to currently
practiced methods of contact tracing, which rely on in-
terviews of infected persons by health authorities and at-
tempts to inform contacts with potential risk exposures by
telephone calls [22].
The possible role of digital tools in personal
management, care, and epidemic control of
COVID-19
According to recommendations of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO), “test, trace, isolate, quarantine” are cor-
nerstones in the attempt to mitigate and later contain the
COVID-19 pandemic [2]. Digital tools can greatly support
these measures in at least two ways. First, improved digi-
tal data flows, proximity tracing and geolocation tracking
can speed up processes of reporting and contact tracing.
For example, a recent modelling study illustrated that ef-
fective epidemic control strongly depends on the effective
time between risk exposure, contact tracing and self-quar-
antine, and that even a one-day reduction can have a sig-
nificant impact on epidemic control, provided that traced
individuals enter self-quarantine immediately [22]. There-
fore, many countries consider apps that facilitate contact
tracing as a possible element of a post-epidemic contain-
ment strategy.
Second, given the ubiquity of internet-connected devices,
crowdsourced surveillance could markedly broaden the
population base and increase the speed of surveillance to
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Table 1: Typology of different apps and technologies in the context of COVID-19 that are aimed at the broader public.
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almost real-time. Indeed, internet-enabled citizen reports
of flu-like illnesses have been around almost since the
dawn of the internet (e.g., pioneered by GoogleFlu) and
operationalised in several countries with some success [25,
26]. However, due to the temporal overlap with the in-
fluenza season and the shared similarities of symptoms,
such crowdsourced reports are not very specific for
COVID-19 (leading to a relatively large number of false
positive reports). Nevertheless, a retrospective analysis
from China illustrates that flu-like illness reports were in-
deed providing relatively marked early signals of the initial
COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan [4].
Table 1 lists additional examples of apps and platforms
that are currently being published in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, namely patient diaries, telehealth
solutions and exposure risk assessments, as well as tools
and interventions to mitigate the consequences of
COVID-19 on mental health. Digital contact tracing and
crowdsourced surveillance primarily aim to contribute to
better epidemic control and therefore provide only limited
personal benefit. Also, the intended effect of these apps is
only achievable if a large fraction of persons in a given ge-
ographic area are actively utilising the tool. That is, there
is a strong “density-dependence” of app usage and broader
benefits.
In contrast to the two formerly described types of technolo-
gies (digital proximity tracing and crowdsourced monitor-
ing), users can receive a personal benefit from some apps
listed in table 1. Nevertheless, these can also contribute to-
wards a more general, population level goal (e.g., aggre-
gating diary data for disease surveillance purposes). The
potential contributions of smartphone and web-based apps
to epidemic control mechanisms are listed in table 2.
In sum, there is an increasing diversity of publicly avail-
able COVID-19 related smartphone and web-based apps,
many with quite different objectives. This abundance can
be very confusing and ultimately harm efforts that require
a strong density-dependence and rely on a large and ideally
representative participation of the target population. There-
fore, now more than ever, assessing these emerging solu-
tions and choosing the right ones should be based on ade-
quate, reliable and easily accessible information.
Legal aspects
Given potential consequences of smartphone and web-
based app usage for end user privacy (particularly for apps
relying on contact tracing or tracking technologies) an as-
sessment of the Swiss legal context is crucial.
Compared with the US, Switzerland has strict privacy
rights rules [27]. The right to privacy is a fundamental
right that includes the right of every person to be protected
against the misuse of their personal data (Article 13 Feder-
al Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). Multiple pro-
visions in the Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP), as
well as other regulations, specify and bolster this funda-
mental right.
The FADP provides an overall framework (not limited to
health data) and deals with data protection using princi-
ples similar to those applied in other countries. The law
has a wide scope and applies to personal data processed
by Federal authorities, private organisations and individual
persons. [28] “Personal data” protected by the FADP is
defined as all information relating to an identified or iden-
tifiable person (Art. 3 lit. a FADP). Non-identifiable data
does not fall within the scope of the FADP. Data are con-
sidered as non-identifiable only if an unreasonable tech-
nical effort leads to the re-identification of the individual.
However, under Swiss law there is no specific definition of
what an “unreasonable effort” means, which leads to un-
certainties [29]. Whether processed data must be qualified
as “personal data” must be determined on a case-by-case
basis. The Federal Data Protection and Information Com-
missioner supervises compliance of federal bodies with
this Act. The Commissioner investigates cases either on
Table 2: Contributions of apps to epidemic control measures.
Possible contributions of apps to epidemic management Mechanism
Providing data from previously untested persons Yields better estimate of number of affected persons
Performing a more timely monitoring of the epidemic Provides case numbers faster, allows faster decision making
Accelerating processes (e.g., contact tracing) Faster identification of contacts allows more complete and faster warning of potentially
exposed persons
Discovering new aspects of dealing with the epidemic on a daily level Personal reports help to investigate, for example, unwanted effects of epidemic control
measures such as lockdowns
Collecting personal history (e.g. regarding exposure risks / symptoms) Stored data help to assess possible risk exposures
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their own initiative or at the request of a third party (Art.
27 FADP). With regard to private manufacturers and in-
dividuals it is, in general, the self-responsibility of manu-
facturers and individuals to ensure that the processed data
comply with the FADP. On complaint, private persons are
liable to a fine if they do not comply with the FADP (Art.
34 FADP). With regard to the decentralised privacy-pre-
serving proximity tracing app (DP-3T app; see table 1),
the Federal Data Protection and Information Commission-
er actively assessed whether the app complies with the
FADP [30].
Some relevant provisions of the FADP can be outlined as
follows: Personal data may only be processed lawfully and
for the purpose indicated at the time of collection, that
is evident from the circumstances, or that is provided for
by law. The collection of personal data and in particular
the purpose of its processing must be evident to the data
subject (Art. 4, FADP [31]). No more data than necessary
may be processed. Furthermore, personal data must be pro-
tected against unauthorised processing through adequate
technical and organisational measures (Art. 7, FADP [31]),
e.g., the software has to align with the current state of
the art and must be protected against risks, such as unau-
thorised or accidental destruction, technical faults, unlaw-
ful use, unauthorised access or other unauthorised process-
ing. To avoid misuse and discrimination and to safeguard
the individual’s privacy rights, personal data must be
anonymised, ideally, at the first possible moment [32].
“Health data” according to the FADP are considered as
“sensitive personal data” and require additional privacy
safeguard measures to those outlined above for other per-
sonal data (Art. 3 FADP). For example, it is an additional
legal requirement, that each user gives his or her “informed
consent” after adequate information, i.e., voluntarily and
expressly agrees to the processing of his or her data (Art. 4,
FADP [31]). Furthermore, each individual has the right to
opt-out anytime and may demand the deletion of their da-
ta. “Health data” are defined as data that allow direct or in-
direct conclusions regarding the physical or mental health
status of an individual [33, 34]. Although there is no doubt
that symptom data qualify as health data, tracking or trac-
ing data (also defined as “mobility data”) may not seem to
qualify as health data at first glance. However, since such
data give indirect conclusions about the physical health
status of an individual, they also qualify as “health data”,
i.e., “sensitive personal data”. [35]
To better safeguard individual privacy rights and to prevent
misuse and discrimination as much as possible, additional
legal and ethical prerequisites have been developed [36,
37]. For example, suggestions are that data should be
stored decentralised, that the government should play a
leading role, and that the government, i.e., the Federal
Council, should enact the basic principles for the imple-
mentation of such apps in a regulation.
Whether health apps comply with the FADP must be as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis. According to the Federal
Data Protection and Information Commissioner, the decen-
tralised privacy-preserving proximity tracing app (DP-3T,
table 1) complies with the FADP [30].
Aim and purpose of the classification frame-
work
The suggested framework aims to enable end users in criti-
cally assessing the purposes, as well as evaluating the trust-
worthiness, of COVID-19 related smartphone and web-
based health apps. Based on these aims, the focus of our
attempt lies less on usability and technical features, but
more on transparency, scientific backing of purported
aims, user privacy and data ownership. The framework is
tailored to Swiss privacy law aspects and thus primarily
geared to the Swiss legal setting. Nonetheless, it may also
be equally applicable in other countries.
Methods
The present effort emerged out of discussions between
Faculty members of the Digital Society Initiative (DSI) at
the University of Zurich and was triggered by the need
for advice on specific digital health technologies that are
currently being advertised or discussed in the media. Two
Faculty members with expertise in Epidemiology and Dig-
ital Health (VVW) and Law and Medicine (KNV) took
the lead on this initiative and defined the overall aim and
scope of this effort. Other DSI members provided system-
atic feedback.
Due to the urgency of the current situation, the approach to
framework development was abbreviated, but nevertheless
systematic. Based on a preliminary search, the checklist for
mHealth apps by van Haasteren and colleagues, which fo-
cuses on the trustworthiness of mHealth apps (with a fo-
cus on physical activity apps), was identified as a suitable
starting point for a framework development [9]. These au-
thors defined trustworthiness as “attributes that compel an
individual to consider another individual or entity worthy
of their trust” [9]. A similar focus on trustworthiness was
deemed appropriate for our study objective, since the cur-
rent epidemic imposes a need for accelerated app release
and development schedules, inevitably limiting available
time for systematic testing and assessment by end users. In
addition, the proposed framework should primarily rely on
information that is usually publicly available from devel-
opers and advertisements.
The initial development process started with a critical re-
view of the checklist of van Haasteren (which had an em-
phasis on fitness apps) and by reducing the number of
items (e.g., those that were primarily pertaining to physical
activity apps). The selection process was conducted by the
two lead authors. In order to tailor the checklist to a well-
suited framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of health
apps in the context of COVID-19, we searched the liter-
ature for additional assessment checklists. Searches were
conducted in PubMed and Google Scholar, using a set of
pre-selected keywords. These included: “mobile health”,
“mHealth”, “health app”, “evaluation”, “framework”, “as-
sessment”, “checklist”, “rating”, “quality assessment” and
“guidelines”. All keywords were identified through a pre-
liminary screening of previous literature reviews and were
carefully combined to increase the searches’ sensitivity. To
ensure timeliness, we limited our searches to the last 10
years. The full search strategy and flow chart are provided
in appendix 1.
Original article Swiss Med Wkly. 2020;150:w20282
Swiss Medical Weekly · PDF of the online version · www.smw.ch
Published under the copyright license “Attribution – Non-Commercial – No Derivatives 4.0”.
No commercial reuse without permission. See http://emh.ch/en/services/permissions.html.
Page 4 of 9
After title and abstract screening, the search yielded 37
+ 2 potentially suitable publications. These were full-text
screened by one author (VN). The final selection yielded
seven publications, which were reviewed in detail by two
authors (VN, VVW) [38–44]. In particular, these addition-
al checklists provided suggestions for additional domains
and assessment criteria to be integrated into the initial
checklist by van Haasteren [9]. When selecting additional
criteria, more weight was given to aspects covering the do-
mains of user control and privacy, whereas additional crite-
ria regarding usability were given less consideration. Like-
wise, criteria that were specific to commercial products,
wearable devices, specific brands, or pertaining to market-
ing or integration with social media were not considered
for our framework because they were outside this study’s
scope.
Based on this review process and the seven additional
checklists, the initial framework was complemented by the
lead authors with additional items that were deemed rel-
evant to user control, privacy and the current COVID-19
context. Further additions were made by the lead authors
based on the assessment of the Swiss legal context, their
subject knowledge and as part of first internal test evalua-
tions of digital health tools (not reported here). This frame-
work was then critically reviewed by other DSI mem-
bers who were previously not involved in the development
process.
Results
A review of the 12 domains (each including between 1
and 8 questions, totalling 43 items) of the van Haasteren
checklist [9] revealed some domains that were considered
less relevant in this particular context of COVID-19: “un-
derstandability”, “brand familiarity”, “societal influences”,
and “autonomy” (which was merged with empowerment
and renamed as “user control/ self-determination”). In ad-
dition, the domain “purpose” was added to allow a critical
assessment of the stated goals of the digital health tool in
the context of the current COVID-19. Overall, of the ini-
tial 12 domains included in [9], eventually 6 were includ-
ed in the final framework (table 3). An additional domain
“purpose” was included in order to allow an assessment of
the health technology’s goals in the context of the current
COVID-19 epidemic. Understanding the COVID-19 relat-
ed purpose of an app is key for acceptance, as well as ef-
fective and adequate use.
After having defined the assessment domains, the specific
checklist items of van Haasteren were reviewed. We delet-
ed items that are not easily applicable to mobile health
apps or not answerable based on public data. In case of re-
dundancies with other items, we tried to combine and re-
formulate the items. The process of domain and item re-
duction is made transparent in supplementary material 2. It
consisted of three steps, starting with initial additions and
deletions in the original van Haasteren list (step 1), fol-
lowed by an internal pre-test and the addition of further
items (step 2), and concluded with a final item rearrange-
ment and wording changes (step 3).
The final assessment framework is illustrated in table 4
(and provided as an excel table in appendix 2). It includes
a total of 40 questions, which can be answered by “yes”,
“no”, “unclear”, “in progress”, and “not applicable”. In ad-
dition to the specific items, the table further includes in-
put fields for a short description of the purpose of the dig-
ital health tool, the postulated target population, and the
sources (e.g., internet links) that were used for the assess-
ment.
The list of questions is followed by a field for a qualitative
statement regarding the use of the app in the context of the
current COVID-19 pandemic, following the explanations
provided in the introductory section of this manuscript. In
particular, the assessment could facilitate the evaluation of
an app’s potential to contribute to different epidemic man-
agement measures, such as those listed in table 2.
Yet, even during emergencies, it is essential to safeguard
personal rights and privacy. Furthermore, clear and easy-
to-understand information on the legal aspects of privacy,
data collection and use are a good indicator of trustworthi-
ness and will ultimately facilitate technology acceptance.
Therefore, an evaluation of the legal embedding and the
control mechanisms to protect a user’s identity and data
ownership are of utmost importance, even more so if
health-related information is collected. To this end, a ded-
icated section specifically assesses the legal embedding
of the app. These items, demanding qualitative assess-
ments, require substantial subject knowledge and may not
be suitable or needed for all evaluations. Nevertheless,
they should form an integral part of systematic COVID-19
app reviews. To this end, the framework outlines, for ex-
ample, basic questions regarding the storage and use of
collected data, data ownership and access rights, or the
transfer of information to third parties.
Finally, the assessment framework concludes with an over-
all statement regarding the specific contribution of digital
health technology in mitigating the current (or future) epi-
demics, having the potential target populations in mind.
Table 3: Domains included in assessment framework.
Assessment domain Description
Purpose The purpose of the app, including the collection and analysis of data, should be clearly stated. Ideally, the purpose and
methods are backed by scientific evidence
Usability Apps should be intuitive and simple to use for intended target group. Ideally, the app has been tested in its specific tar-
get population.
Information accuracy The information collected by the app should be valid and reliable. Data provided to end user should be current and ac-
curate. Evidence to this effect should be presented.
Organisational attributes / reputation End user should know who is behind an app (in terms of technological development, funding, or endorsement).
Transparency Data collection should be fit for purpose and as little as needed. This includes data gathered by integrated device sen-
sors.
End user should be informed about potential risks of app usage and further sharing of data.
Privacy End user should be informed about privacy policies and data protection measures in a clear, transparent fashion.
User control / self-determination End user should be informed whether and how they can access and control their data. This includes procedures in case
the end user terminates participation.
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Purpose 1) Does the app have a clearly stated, understandable purpose for data collection and analysis?
2) Is the postulated purpose backed by scientific research?
3) Are the intended goals achievable, measureable?
4) Is regular feedback provided on the achievement of goals?
5) On which level are the stated benefits:
a. personal level?
b. societal or population level?
6) Do the stated benefits depend on a certain number of persons using the app?
Usability 7) What is the evidence that the app is easy to use and has a friendly end-user interface?
8) Does the app send out a reasonable number of notifications?
9) Is the app accessible / understandable by its target audience?
10) Has the app been trialled / tested in its target audience?
Information accuracy 11) Does the app create accurate measurements?
12) Does the app ensure that personalised data tailored to end-users are precise?
13) Is the information gathered and/or provided by the app backed by robust research?
14) Does the app provide regular updates to contents based on improved research and recommendations?
Organizational attributes / Reputation 15) Does the company curating the app have clear policies on how to handle end-user data?
16) Is the app profit-oriented?
17) Is the app affiliated with a non-governmental organization or a reputable government agency?
18) Is the manufacturer of the app based in Switzerland?
19) Are all data stored and processed in Switzerland?
20) Has the manufacturer developed similar apps in the past?
Transparency 21) Does the app inform the end user about the voluntary nature to participate?
22) Does the app highlight potential risks or side effects resulting from its use?
23) Does the app inform the end user what data is being collected?
24) Does the app require only minimal personal data of end-users?
25) Does the app require only minimal access permissions for using mobile phone functionalities (e.g. location, address
book, camera)?
26) Is the source code publicly available?
27) Does the app integrate third-party software or use third-party APIs?
Privacy 28) Are the privacy policies concise, clear and easy to understand?
29) Is the data generated from the app secured by end-to-end-encryption?
30) How is the data generated from the app stored:
a. locally on the device?
b. encrypted?
31) Is the data generated from the app anonymised for storage or analysis so that individuals are non-identifiable?
32) How is the data anonymized?
33) How long is the generated data stored?
User control/ Self-Determination 34) Do end-users act as the proprietors of the data generated from the app?
35) Does the app allow end-users to opt-in and decide which data can be stored or processed?
36) Does the app allow users to retrieve their data?
37) Can users get information about the results of the data analysis?
38) Does the app seek explicit end-user permission before sharing data with third-parties?
39) Does the app allow end-users to easily delete their data?
40) Do the users have the option to opt-out anytime and, if the case, is it clearly described what happens to the data?
Assessment of the subject specific basis of this app re. purpose, evidence base (2-3 sentences)
Assessment of legal basis of this app re. compliance with the Swiss regulations (2-3 sentences)
Overall assessment: For whom may this app be suited and what can it potentially contribute to mitigate the COVID-19 epidemic?
This latter aspect is very relevant because technologies that
do not manage to catch on in the target group will not be
able to create desired benefits. This becomes even more of
an issue if the benefits are directed at special populations
such as minors or the elderly (which may or may not over-
lap with the target population of end users as envisioned by
the app developers).
Discussion
Having applied a structured approach, we generated an as-
sessment framework for smartphone and web-based health
app evaluations in the context of the current COVID-19
pandemic. Starting with a checklist developed by van
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Haasteren et al. [9], we systematically reduced, combined
and added items in order to create a set of questions that
are generic but should nevertheless be answerable through
publicly available information, as provided by app de-
velopers and manufacturers. Although developed for the
Swiss setting and referencing Swiss laws, the framework
is likely transferrable to other settings, particularly within
Europe. Swiss data protection laws are similar to the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that regulates the
processing of data relating to individuals in the European
Union [45].
Given the plans for widespread application of, for exam-
ple, proximity tracing technologies, frameworks as ours
are clearly relevant to engage the public in the discussion
about benefits and risks of specific apps. The present
framework complements existing tools by integrating an
assessment of an app’s contribution to epidemic control
mechanisms. Our framework shares similar domains with
other checklists and frameworks that focus on security
risks, privacy or manufacturer reputation, but is less fo-
cused on questions regarding app popularity (e.g., a user’s
likeliness to recommend the app) or validity and measure-
ment reliability, which are somewhat less relevant or un-
known in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition, our framework places less emphasis on usabil-
ity and attractive design than other checklists. Although it
is undeniable that these factors are crucial for a wide dis-
semination of apps and long-term user retention, we argue
that, in the current state of emergency, users may be more
likely to decide on an app’s use based on its intended pur-
pose, likely rendering design aspects of secondary impor-
tance.
Our approach is subject to some limitations. Because of
time pressure, the methods for framework development
needed to deviate from standard development and liter-
ature review procedures. The literature search, although
performed with great care, could not be as exhaustive as
would normally be considered standard. Furthermore, the
domain definition and item reductions were primarily per-
formed by just two reviewers. This procedural limitation
was somehow mitigated by the final review and revision
process, which involved a larger group of experts. Because
of these limitations, the framework should not be consid-
ered definitive, especially since only a small number of
test evaluations could be performed in the short amount
of available time. Nevertheless, we believe that the frame-
work offers a valuable and highly informative starting
point for initial assessments of emerging smartphone and
web-based apps to control the current COVID-19 pandem-
ic.
To summarise, the present framework synthesises several
well-established app assessment domains, providing ex-
haustive guidance on evaluating an app’s trustworthiness,
epidemiological rationale and legal robustness. Ideally, the
specific questions of the framework should be answerable
by end users, based on publicly available information, such
as manufacturer websites and documentations. However,
answering some of the framework’s items is likely to ad-
ditionally require some expert knowledge. In combination
with the framework’s current length, we believe that an ab-
breviated list, along with more extensive instructions on
how to complete the items, will be required. The develop-
ment of such a simplified end-user checklist is envisioned
as a follow-up project.
Furthermore, the framework also provides some guidance
for manufacturers on what information would be desirable
in order to facilitate transparency and trustworthiness, both
of which are key in times of crisis and uncertainty. Ulti-
mately, the framework should aid individual decision mak-
ing and steer the public’s attention towards crowdsourced
digital health efforts, such as proximity tracing apps. Many
of these efforts might have the potential to facilitate epi-
demic management while preserving privacy and individ-
ual user rights. Frameworks like ours aim to support the
public in identifying such apps and keeping them apart
from non-transparent and less trustworthy digital health so-
lutions.
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Search ((((((((((mHealth[Title]) OR (mobile[Title] AND
health[Title])) OR (smartphone[Title] AND health[Title]))
OR (health[Title] AND app*[Title])) OR (disease[Title]
AND app*[Title])))) AND (((((((((((((((Evaluat*[Title]
AND list[Title])) OR (Evaluat*[Title] AND frame-
work[Title])) OR (Evaluat*[Title] AND model[Title])) OR
(Evaluat*[Title] AND systematic[Title])) OR (Evalu-
at*[Title] AND scale[Title])) OR (Classif*[Title] AND
framework[Title])) OR (Assess*[Title] AND list[Title]))
OR (Assess*[Title] AND framework[Title])) OR (Quali-
ty[Title] AND assess*[Title])) OR Rate[Title]) OR Rat-
ing[Title]) OR Checklist[Title]) OR Check-list[Title]) OR
Guideline*[Title]))) AND "last 10 years"[PDat]) Fil-
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Figure S1: Search strategy.
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